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Abstract
The aim of the present review was to investigate the theoretical framework of working memory 
as it relates to the control of attention in sport and thereby apply cognitive psychological theory 
to sports, but also use the sports domain to advance cognitive theory. We first introduce dual-
process theories as an overarching framework for attention-related research in sports. Then a 
central mechanism is highlighted how working memory is involved in the control of attention in 
sports by reviewing research demonstrating that the activated contents in working memory 
control the focus of attention. The second part of the paper reviews literature showing that 
working memory capacity is an important individual difference variable that is predictive of 
controlling attention in a goal-directed manner and avoiding distraction and interference in 
sports. Finally, we address the question whether differences in working memory capacity 
contribute to sport expertise. 
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3Working Memory, Attentional Control, and Expertise in Sports: A review
Until fairly recently great athletes were typically described in terms of physical ability so 
researchers  did  not  pay  much  attention  to  cognitive  factors  involved  in  sport  performance 
(Starkes, Helsen, & Jack, 2001). On a colloquial level dichotomies like jocks vs. nerds or brain 
vs.  brawn might  have kept  researchers  from studying cognition in  sport  performance as  the 
physical aspect of sports has far more intuitive appeal than the cognitive aspect. In addition, 
when looking back at the historical development of psychological research,  the experimental 
information processing approach to cognition forced psychologists to break down large problems 
and questions about the functioning of the human mind into very small and isolated aspects of 
cognition (see Mandler, 2007 for a review). As a consequence, each area of research became 
increasingly specialized to answer ever more specific questions and in turn lost sight of how the 
individual cognitive components interact in everyday behavior (Styles, 2005). Neisser (1976, p. 
7)  recognized  this  problem  and  stressed  that,  despite  the  difficulty  of  studying  cognition, 
psychologists have to make “a greater effort to understand cognition as it occurs in the ordinary 
environment and in the context of natural purposeful activity”. 
In the field of memory research, a major advance in this regard was made by Baddeley 
and Hitch (1974, p. 47) with their concept of working memory: “despite more than a decade of 
intensive research on the topic of short-term memory, we still know virtually nothing about its 
role in normal human information processing”. Today the concept of working memory is one of 
the most researched topics currently in cognitive psychology. Working Memory can be defined 
as the cognitive mechanisms capable of retaining a small amount of information in an active 
state for use in ongoing tasks (for reviews, see Baddeley, 2007; Conway, Jarrold, Kane, Miyake, 
& Towse, 2007; Cowan, 2005; Miyake & Shah, 1999).  Hence,  working memory is of central 
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importance to understanding human cognition as it occurs in everyday life and scholars have 
attributed an important evolutionary advantage to species possessing the capacities of working 
memory (Carruthers, 2013, Engle 2010).  The most important advance of the working memory 
model was the proposal of a system not only responsible for the storage of information but also 
for mechanisms of cognitive control and attention (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974,  Baddeley, 2003) 
which made the model applicable to complex behavior. 
In the present article we build on the progress that has been made in cognitive psychology 
by reviewing research on the special  cognitive component  working memory,  especially as it 
relates  to  attentional  control,  to  enhance  understanding  of  sport  performance.  We  not  only 
attempt to apply cognitive theory to the sports domain, but also use the sports domain to advance 
cognitive psychological theory (Moran, 2009; Moran & Brady, 2010).. By adopting dual-process 
theories (Evans & Stanovich, 2013a; 2013b; Furley, Schweizer, & Bertrams, 2015;  Kahneman, 
2011; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) as a meta-theoretical starting point, the first section of this 
paper highlights  the close relationship of working memory and attention and argues that this 
relationship can be considered a central cognitive mechanism in the control of attention in sports 
(Furley & Memmert, 2013). In the second part of the paper we use individual differences in 
working memory capacity and sport expertise to shed further light on attentional control in sport 
and follow the call of Cronbach (1957) who argued that the richness of human behavior can only 
be fully understood by combining  experimental and differential approaches to psychology. 
Dual-Process Theories and Sports Performance
Numerous theories propose that human behavior is controlled by two qualitatively 
different modes of processing, automatic and controlled processing (Frankish & Evans, 2009; see 
Furley et al. 2015 for a more detailed account of dual-process theories in sport). These two forms 
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5of processing are specified by their reliance on attentional control which can be defined as the 
goal-directed allocation of cognitive processing resources to internal and external stimuli 
(Pashler, Johnston, & Ruthruff, 2001).
An influential dual-process model that attempts to establish  commonalities of various 
domain specific dual-process theories is the default-interventionist model (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013a). This model distinguishes between Type 1 processing—defined as both initiated and 
completed in the presence of relevant triggering conditions—and Type 2 processing—defined as 
requiring working memory for hypothetical thinking and mental simulation (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013a). Importantly, Type 1 processes are distinguished from Type 2 processes by the assumption 
that the response/solution to a problem has become part of its cognitive representation. For 
example when solving a simple equation like 2+2 or when an experienced track-and-field athlete 
crosses hurdles during a race. In both cases the solution to the problems is triggered by the 
context without requiring further controlled processing as it is part of the cognitive 
representation of that problem. Similarly, certain stimulus configurations on the sport field can 
automatically trigger a certain response of an athlete, for example if a point-guard in basketball 
perceives that his defender is too far away from him and therefore takes the open jump shot. The 
solution has become part of the cognitive representation because of the great amount of practice 
and learning experiences of experienced athletes. 
On the other hand, Type 2 processes are required either to override a triggered response 
that is part of a representation or for a response to a novel problem that has never become part of 
a representation. It is important to note that Type 2 processes can also be triggered by the context, 
but only Type 1 processes autonomously run to completion as the response is part of the 
cognitive representation. Type 2 processes might be initiated autonomously but subsequently 
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require working memory engagement to be completed (Thompson, 2013). Further, Thompson 
(2013) argues that working memory engagement is not an all or nothing criterion, but can vary 
depending on the task demands. Therefore, Type 2 processes should be defined along a 
continuum regarding their demands on working memory. 
Successful sport performance often requires Type 1 processing as  time pressure does not 
allow for the effortful controlled Type 2 processing. On the contrary, Type 2 processing has the 
potential to disturb athletic performance as predicted by the paralysis by analysis hypothesis 
(e.g. Baumeister, 1984; Beilock & Carr, 2001; Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992)—
i.e. skilled performance can be disrupted from directing attention towards monitoring the skill 
execution. A large amount of  practice and training in sports is undertaken precisely to 
circumvent the limitations of the slow effortful Type 2 processing and automate behaviors (e.g. 
Schmidt & Wrisberg, 2004; Williams & Ericsson, 2005) as the cognitive demands during skill 
execution decrease with continuous practice (e.g. Anderson, 1982; Fitts & Posner, 1967; 
Schmidt, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). Therefore, highly practiced basketball players do 
not need to attend to dribbling the ball and instead can use their freed attentional resources for 
higher order processes (e.g. scanning for open teammates).
Given the importance of autonomous Type 1 processing in sports it is not surprising that 
the study of human motor performance has mainly been driven by a “neo-Gibsonian approach 
with little regard for the relevance of internal representations such as schemata, or cognitive 
concepts such as Shallice’s SAS” (Baddeley (2007, p. 317). Similarly, Toner and Moran (2014, 
p. 1) concluded that contemporary theorizing in sports overemphasizes the autonomous nature of 
skilled sport performance: “instead of relying wholly on unthinking spontaneity to guide their 
performance, elite athletes appear to alternate between different modes of cognitive processing”.
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7For this reason, the present review focuses on the involvement of Type 2 processing’s 
“centerpiece” working memory in controlling attention in sports. 
 
Controlling Attention in Sports
Attention can be defined as subsuming all cognitive processes responsible for increasing 
or decreasing the level of activation of internal or external representations (Desimone & Duncan, 
1995; Knudsen, 2007; Pashler et al., 2001; Posner & Petersen, 1990). According to Pashler et al. 
(2001) attention increases or decreases the level of activation according to both the goals and 
needs people have and the stimuli that impinge on them. Pertinent to the present review, recent  
evidence demonstrates a reciprocal relationship between the current contents of working memory 
and attention. This shows that attention does not only allow stimuli to access working memory 
(e.g. Atkinson & Schiffrin, 1968) but working memory can also influence the control of attention 
(Awh, Jonides, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998; Downing, 2000; Huang & Pashler, 2007; Soto, Heinke, 
Humphreys, & Blanco, 2005; Soto & Humphreys, 2007, 2008) by modulating the sensitivity of 
neural  circuits  in  favor  of  the  information  currently  being  processed  in  working  memory 
(Gazzaley & Nobre, 2012; Knudsen, 2007). 
A theory of attentional control that takes both bottom-up sensory factors and top-down 
working  memory factors  into  account  is  the  biased  competition  theory  (BCT,  Desimone  & 
Duncan, 1995) of selective attention. Objects in the world and internal representations compete 
for processing resources, and this competition is biased towards information that is currently 
relevant for behavior (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Attention serves to enhance the response of 
behaviorally  relevant  neurons  as  a  consequence  of  this  competition.  Hence,  if  an  object  is 
preactivated in working memory and later appears in the visual display, this object will have an 
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
2
8,
advantage in the competition for selective attention and is therefore likely to become the focus of 
attention. 
This biased competition theoretical explanation can be transferred to the context of sports 
as illustrated in the following example: a basketball point guard might not pass to a team-mate 
under the “hoop” who is waving (stronger stimulus) but instead passes to the shooting guard at 
the three point line because of the intended offensive play announced by the coach during the last 
timeout, in which he was told that the team needs open 3-point shots in order to win the game. In 
a  series  of  experiments  (Furley  &  Memmert,  2013)  this  biased  competition  theorizing  was 
transferred and tested in a simulated sport decision-making task. In this experimental paradigm 
participants were asked to hold an image of a certain player in working memory—which was 
controlled for by a memory probe task—while engaged in a time constrained decision task, for 
example, deciding which player to pass to in a schematic team handball or basketball situation. 
The results  showed that  an athlete’s  attention  is  guided towards  certain  team-members  who 
resemble  internal  templates  that  are  currently  being  held  in  working  memory,  or  stated 
differently, that attention was controlled by a template held in working memory. Interestingly, the 
attention  guidance  effect  from  working  memory  was  especially  pronounced  in  complex 
situations  in  which  more players  were present  in  the visual  array that  competed  for  limited 
attentional resources. Based on these findings—and a large body of evidence from cognitive 
psychology and  neuropsychology  (e.g.  Soto,  Hodsoll,  Rotshtein,  & Humphreys,  2008  for  a 
review)—we argue  that the link between working memory and attention can be considered a 
central  mechanism  in  “everyday  purposeful  activities”  (Neisser,  1976)  via  its  function  “to 
program top-down attentional control”. Of relevance in this respect, Moores, Laiti, and Chelazzi 
(2003; see also Duncan & Humphreys,  1989) review evidence that top-down control signals 
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9from working memory representations do not only raise the activity of object representations in 
the visual scene that  match the internal template in some properties,  but this  activation also 
spreads to associated representations. A finding in line with this proposal is that words held in 
working  memory  direct  eye  movements  towards  semantically  related  images  (Huettig  & 
Altmann,  2005).  More  recent  studies  (Soto  &  Humphreys,  2007;  Huang  &  Pashler,  2007) 
corroborated these findings by showing that verbal items that were activated in the circuitry of 
working memory facilitated visual search of semantically related visual objects. 
Following  from the  above  line  of  reasoning  on the  biased  completion  theory,  verbal 
instructions by for example coaches are likely to gain access to athletes’ working memory and in 
turn  have  the  potential  of  controlling  the  athletes’ subsequent  focus  of  attention.  Coaches 
frequently give specific instructions and introduce predetermined offensive plays (e.g., American 
football, basketball, or  team handball) in order to reduce the complexity of the game and give 
guidance to athletes by directing their attentional focus (cf. Williams, Davids, & Williams, 1999). 
Typically, these offensive strategies include only a subset of players, and the decision maker 
therefore has to choose from only a limited number of possibilities. For this reason, it is possible 
that a player who is not part of a tactical instruction or a specific offensive play is unexpected 
and is not incorporated into the decision-making process. This hypothesis was confirmed in a 
series of experiments (Furley, Memmert, & Heller, 2010, Memmert & Furley, 2007) showing 
that  attention guiding instructions  can lead to  important  information being overseen in  team 
sports. 
The reviewed findings support Kahneman’s (2011) claim that an important function of 
Type 2 information processing is the adoption of “task sets” by programming memory to control 
attention. A method athletes can use for programming working memory to control attention can 
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be via the internal processes of self-talk and imagery which are processes associated with the 
domain-specific  storage  buffers  (the  phonological  loop  and  the  visual-spatial  sketchpad)  of 
Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) model. Self-talk can be defined as an internal dialogue in which the 
sender of a verbal message is also the intended receiver (see Van Raalte, Vincent, & Brewer, 
2016 for a recent review of self-talk in sports). In a very general sense imagery can be defined as 
the mental creation or re-creation of sensory experiences that appear to the person imagining 
them (Morris, Spittle, & Watt, 2005). A useful analogy to clarify the proposed mechanism of how 
self-talk and imagery can program working memory to control attention is a thermostat (Folk,  
Remington, & Wright, 1994). A thermostat is set to a pre-defined temperature and actives the 
heating system automatically if the temperature in the environment differs from the pre-defined 
temperature.  In this  respect the person controls the thermostat  in advance and the control  is 
subsequently executed autonomously without requiring the person anymore. Similarly templates 
currently  active  in  the  circuitry  of  working  memory—e.g.  mental  images,  goals,  strategies, 
tactics,  cue  words—set  attentional  control  settings  in  advance  and  stimuli  associated  with 
representations held in working memory will receive attentional processing resources without 
any further deliberate cognitive involvement.
Integrating Research Findings from the Sports Domain within the Working  
Memory/Attentional Control Framework. 
In this section we argue that the control of attention by the activated contents in working 
memory might not only apply to decision making situations in sport but might generalize to a 
whole range of sporting contexts. Although, we acknowledge that this section can be considered 
mainly speculative it serves the function of stating testable hypotheses and hopefully stimulating 
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future  research  and applied  guidance  on  how coaches  and  athletes  can  “load  their  working 
memories” in ways that are facilitative for sport performance. 
Internal or external focus of attention. An increasing body of research distinguishes an 
external focus of attention from an internal focus of attention when learning or performing sports 
skills (Wulf, 2007 for a review). The external focus of attention focuses attention on the effects 
of  a  movement  while  the  internal  focus  monitors  the  bodily  execution  of  the  movement. 
Increasing evidence suggests that, in general, an external focus of attention is facilitative for both 
learning and performance of sport skills in comparison to an internal focus of attention.  For 
example when performing a tennis shot athletes can instruct themselves to watch the rotation of 
the seam on the tennis ball (external focus) thereby avoiding unwanted conscious monitoring of 
the technique of the shot (internal focus). Research has shown that this kind of external focus of 
attention is beneficial for smooth skill execution (Wulf, 2007 for a review). Therefore, certain 
cue words can be used via self-talk to “load working memory” and in turn induce an external  
focus of attention that is likely to be facilitative of performance and learning. 
Anxiety and attentional control theory. Attentional Control Theory’s (ACT, Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007) main tenet is that human behaviour is controlled by two 
attentional systems: a top-down system that is guided by activated contents in working memory 
(goals, expectations, knowledge); and a bottom-up system that is guided by salient stimuli in the 
environment (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). A further important assumption of ACT is that anxiety 
or  performance  pressure  causes  an  imbalance  between  these  two  systems  in  favour  of  the 
bottom-up system, which can probably be considered an evolved mechanism intended to detect 
threatening  stimuli  (Eysenck  et  al.,  2007).  That  is,  with  increasing  anxiety  attention  to  the 
threatening stimuli increases, probably in order to allow rapid reactions to escape any potential 
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negative consequences for one’s wellbeing. In this respect, it seems feasible that anxiety induces 
worries and ruminations that gain access to working memory and thereby direct the focus of 
attention toward threatening stimuli. Wilson, Wood, and Vine (2009) found evidence for such 
theorizing (although it is not clear what the activated contents of participants’ working memory 
were) in the field of sport by demonstrating that anxious participants were more likely to focus 
on the ‘threatening’ goalkeeper in a soccer penalty kick than less anxious players. 
In this respect it further seems feasible to speculate about ironic effects (Wegner, 1994) 
that have been shown in the sport performance domain (Bakker, Oudejans, Binsch, & van der 
Kamp 2006; Beilock, Afremow, Rabe, & Carr, 2001). For example Bakker and colleagues (2006) 
demonstrated that the instruction “not to shoot near the goalkeeper” during a soccer penalty kick 
had the ironic effect that penalty takers more often shot close to the goalkeeper. In this regards 
the  attentional  guidance  effect  by  the  contents  of  working  memory  might  have  caused  an 
attentional  shift  towards  the  goalkeeper  as  the  goalkeeper  was  included  in  the  instruction 
(although the instruction was not to shoot close to him) which in turn lead to shots being placed 
closer to the goalkeeper (cf. Wilson et al., 2009). Future research might want to investigate the 
relationship between working memory, ironic processing and the allocation of attention in sports 
performance.  
Choking under pressure.  Similarly to the point above, performance decrements due to 
paralysis by analysis (Baumeister, 1984; Beilock, Bertenthal, McCoy, & Carr, 2004; Gray, 2004) 
might also be reconciled by the working memory attention relationship as it seems feasible that 
working memory not only controls the external focus of attention but also the internal focus of 
attention. Baumeister (1984) suggests that pressure raises self-consciousness and worry about 
performing correctly. These self-conscious thoughts will be active in working memory. Studies 
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have shown that self-conscious thoughts induce an attentional shift to monitoring the step-by-
step execution of movement in an attempt to stabilize performance (Beilock et al., 2004; Gray, 
2004). Paradoxically, instead of stabilizing performance by directing attention to skill execution, 
studies (e.g. Baumeister, 1984; Beilock et al.,  2004; Gray, 2004) have demonstrated that this 
explicit monitoring of well-learned skills disrupts skill execution, because Type 2 processing is 
too slow to deal with the real time control of the proceduralized skills.
Psychological skill training: Imagery and self-talk. In line with the thermostat analogy 
(Folk et al., 1994), one might argue that the activated contents of working memory cannot only 
control an athlete’s attentional focus in situ, but that imagery and self-talk could train an athlete’s  
attentional focus towards task-relevant cues during performance and away from irrelevant cues. 
This  argumentation  was  first  stated  by  Feltz  and  Landers  (1983)  by  proposing  that  mental 
imagery  will  train  a  beneficial  attentional  set  directing  athletes’  attentional  focus  during 
subsequent  sport  performance.  In  this  respect  the  working  memory  attention  link  has  the 
potential  to  serve  as  the  theoretical  background  for  the  effectiveness  of  various  applied 
interventions within sport psychology (e.g. self-talk strategies, gaze training, mental practice or 
goal-setting).  The field of sport  psychology has been criticized for neglecting to  empirically 
confirm that its interventions are effective (e.g. Gardner & Moore, 2006) which might be partly 
attributable to the fact that intervention studies are difficult to conduct without a solid theoretical 
basis from which strong and testable predictions can be derived.
Individual Differences: The Role of Working Memory Capacity in Sports
So far we have highlighted how Type 2 processing “uses working memory to control 
attention”. In the second part of the paper we focus on the question of whether certain people are 
more  skilled  at  controlling  their  attention  and  therefore  benefit  in  situations  that  require 
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attentional control. In this respect we follow a recent call of Vogel and Awh (2008) who argued 
that  cognitive theory development  can substantially benefit  from systematically investigating 
individual-differences instead of treating these as ‘error variance’ (Cronbach, 1957).. Hence, we 
will  continue  by  reviewing  individual  differences  in  working  memory  to  aid  further 
understanding of attentional control in sports performance. 
In contrast to the original notion of short-term memory as that capacity to hold an amount 
of information (e.g., Miller, 1956), complex span measures of working memory capacity (WMC) 
have  emerged over  the  last  decades  assessing  the  attentional  processing  component  (central 
executive) instead of the storage component of Baddeley and Hitch’s working memory model 
(Conway,  Kane,  Bunting,  Hambrick,  Wilhelm,  &  Engle,  2005).  These  measures  have  been 
successful at predicting performance in situations affording controlled attention in the presence 
of interference and have led to the formulation of the controlled attention theory of WMC (see 
Engle,  2002 for  a  review).  In  a  nutshell,  this  theory states  that  WMC is  a  domain  general 
measure, reflecting an individual’s ability to control his/her attention (e.g., Conway et al., 2005; 
Kane,  Bleckley,  Conway,  & Engle,  2001;  Kane,  Conway,  Hambrick,  & Engle,  2007;  Engle, 
2002). 
Previously we argued that a lot of skilled sports performance does not require controlled 
attention as it can be carried out automatically with little or no reliance on working memory. 
However, we also made the argument that there are situations in sport that do require attentional 
control. In this regard, the cognitive psychological literature (e.g., Engle, 2002) suggests that the 
ability to control attention is especially important during challenging activities in contexts (a) 
providing concurrent distraction and (b) interference from prior experience or habit. 
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WMC in focusing attention and avoiding distraction in sport.  In regard to focusing 
attention and avoiding distraction,  Furley and Memmert  (2012) demonstrated that  basketball 
players scoring high on WMC measures (Conway et al., 2005) were better able to focus their 
attention on a  computer-based basketball  decision making task while  blocking out  irrelevant 
auditory  distraction  (Furley  &  Memmert,  2012,  Experiment  1).  Hence,  WMC  remained 
predictive of controlling attention between different modalities in this sport performance context, 
as participants were required to attend to visually presented information to decide on a sport-
specific  tactical  decision  while  ignoring  a  stream  of  auditory  information  presented  over 
headphones.  The fact  that  athletes  with  a  high WMC reported  hearing their  own first  name 
significantly less frequently in the unattended stream of auditory information shows that they 
were more successful in blocking out the task irrelevant auditory stream. In addition, the high 
WMC Basketball players appeared less prone to everyday distraction on the Cognitive Failure 
Questionnaire (CFQ, Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982) compared to low WMC 
Basketball players, which supports the suggestion that working memory is important in everyday 
attentional  control.  This  correlational  finding  between  the  self-reported  distractions  in  the 
everyday lives of athletes and WMC can be taken as indication that the association between 
WMC and sport performance might transfer beyond computer-based sport tasks as used in Furley 
and Memmert (2012) to more representative performance contexts. However, direct evidence for 
this suggestion has not been obtained in the sport performance context to date. 
WMC in resolving interference in sports. Athletes  are  also assumed to need  Type 2 
processing  (i.e.  WMC),  when  situations  demand a  different  behavior  to  that  which  one  has 
become  accustomed  to,  or  when  the  prepotent  response  triggered  by  the  context  is  not 
appropriate—i.e. to resolve response competition and conflict in interference situations. In this 
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respect,  research from cognitive psychology has  shown that  people with high WMC have a 
superior ability to control their attention which they can use for resolving competition between 
competing action tendencies and action plans (Engle, 2002 for a review). In a first computer-
based study within the field of sports,  Furley and Memmert  (2012) showed that  ice hockey 
players’ WMC was predictive of how well they adjusted their decision making behavior to the 
demands  of  the  situation,  instead  of  relying  on  an  inappropriate,  prepotent  action  plan. 
Specifically, ice hockey players with a low WMC (measured with the automated operation span 
task;  Unsworth,  Heitz,  Schrock,  &  Engle,  2005)  more  often  blindly”  followed  a  tactical 
instruction from a virtual coach during a simulated time-out, even though it was not appropriate 
for the game situation. On the other hand, ice hockey players with a high WMC more often 
adjusted their tactical decision to the demands of the situation instead of “blindly” relying on the 
instructions they got during a time-out. 
.
Competitive sports  are  full  of situations in  which athletes have to suppress prepotent 
(automized) responses due to contextual circumstances. For example, team sport athletes usually 
have dominant action tendencies (e.g. favorite goal corners in soccer or hockey, a dominant feint 
side in basketball, or a preference for long distance shots vs. driving to the basket in basketball). 
However, in the days of professional game analyses, opponents will usually be aware of these 
dominant action tendencies of individual athletes and most likely have been informed about how 
to  defend  these  players  successfully.  Given  the  computer-based  findings  from  Furley  and 
Memmert (2012) it seems appropriate to hypothesize that WMC would also be predictive of 
resolving  response  competition  in  these  representative  performance  context,  i.e.  athletes  not 
relying  on  their  dominant  action  tendencies  and  adjusting  their  behavior  according  to  the 
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situational demands. Hence, future research has to scrutinize first findings on the association 
between WMC and attentional control in sports in more representative performance contexts. In 
this respect a first study by Wood, Vine and Wilson (2015) can be considered an important step 
in  this  direction.  Wood et  al.  found that  individual  differences in  WMC could predict  those 
individuals  who would experience attentional  disruptions  and performance decrements  under 
pressure in a Stroop handgun shooting task whilst wearing eye-tracking equipment. Specifically, 
low-WMC individuals, relative to high-WMC individuals, experienced impaired visual search 
time  to  locate  the  target  and  sub-optimal  aiming  behavior  indicative  of  greater  attentional 
disruptions under anxiety conditions. In this respect, the results suggest that WMC is not only a 
good predictor of an individual’s ability to control their attention but can also predict those likely 
to fail under pressure in sports.
WMC and creativity. A further domain in which the predictive power of WMC has been 
investigated is creativity (e.g. De Dreau, Nijstad, Bass, Wolsink, & Roskes, 2012). However, this 
line  of  research  has  provided  inconclusive  results  with  some  studies  suggesting  that  high 
working memory individuals are more creative as they are more likely to overcome interference 
caused  by automatic,  unoriginal  responses  and therefore  better  able  to  break  away from an 
ineffective approach to a problem (e.g. De Dreu et al., 2012; Lee & Therriault, 2013). On the 
other hand, some studies have suggested that high WMC enables people to “zoom in” the focus 
of attention and narrow the search in the problem space,  and in turn,  harm creative thought 
(Wiley & Jarosz, 2012). 
Creativity is assumed to be of importance in sports  (Memmert, 2011 for a review), for 
example, by allowing athletes to come up with new ways of outsmarting one’s competitors and 
opponents. However, a recent study by Furley and Memmert (2015) provided first evidence that 
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domain-general  WMC was not  associated with creativity in  a soccer-specific  creativity task. 
Hence, WMC was not a limiting factor on creative decision making amongst skilled performers. 
Experienced soccer players did not benefit from a superior WMC in finding creative solutions to 
soccer-specific situations.
Although, WMC was not predictive of creativity in sports, there is a growing body of 
evidence  highlighting  the  importance  of  working  memory and  attentional  control  in  sports. 
Therefore, it seems feasible that this capacity might be an important factor contributing to team 
sport expertise. 
Individual Differences: Sport Expertise, Working Memory, and Attention
A major topic of interest  is how people achieve high levels of skills in domains like 
sports,  music,  or  other  games  (Ericsson,  Charness,  Feltovich,  & Hoffman,  2006;  Hambrick, 
Macnamara, Campitelli, Ullénjj, & Mosingjj, 2016 for reviews). This topic is embedded in the 
long-standing  nature  versus  nurture  debate  (e.g.  Ridley,  2003)  that  concerns  the  relative 
influence of innate factors versus learning and experience in determining skill level or expertise. 
“No psychologist has had a greater impact on the public’s view of expertise 
than Ericsson” (Hambrick et al., 2016) and it is therefore not surprising that 
his and his collaborators’ perspective (Ericsson, Charness, Feltovich, & Hoffman, 2006 
for a review) has also dominated the sports expertise literature. The dominant view within 
this field has been that  expert sport performers gain an advantage by acquiring cognitive skills 
and strategies through deliberate practice that increase their efficiency of processing information 
(e.g. Eccles, 2006; Furley & Dörr, 2015). According to Williams et al. (1999), these adaptations 
are essential  because the speed of many sports may exceed the basic information-processing 
capacities of athletes. This view specifically states that athletes with years of experience in an 
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activity such as team sports only differ in cognitive processing skills directly related to their field 
of  experience and no differences should be observable in  “basic” cognitive abilities  such as 
memory capacity,  perceptual acuity,  or intelligence (e.g.,  Eccles, 2006; Ericsson et al.,  2006; 
Feltovich,  Prietula,  &  Ericsson,  2006).  These  findings  are  embedded  in  the  theoretical 
framework  of  “Long-term Working  Memory”  (Ericsson  & Kintsch,  1995)  which  states  that 
expert  performers bypass their  natural processing limitations by acquiring special  knowledge 
structures that function as associations between encoded information and retrieval cues in long-
term memory. Hence,  in order to retrieve the encoded information experts must reinstate the 
encoding conditions by using the same retrieval cues (Guida, Gobet, Tardieu, & Nicolas, 2012). 
In this manner Long-Term Working Memory becomes available for expert performers—but only 
in their  specific field of expertise—and enables them to behave adaptively to the situational 
demands of their performance environment. According to Ericsson, Krampe, and Tesch-Römer 
(1993) domain specific knowledge is acquired through deliberate practice—“activities that have 
been specially designed to improve the current level of performance” (p. 368)—and serves to 
circumvent performance limitations associated with basic abilities, e.g. WMC: “Performers can 
acquire skills that circumvent basic limits on working memory capacity” (Ericsson & Charness, 
1994, p. 725).
However, this conceptualization has been challenged by empirical evidence (Hambrick & 
Meinz, 2011; Macnamara, Hambrick, & Oswald, 2014) and has been criticized in the scientific 
literature. While this criticism does not question the importance of deliberate 
practice  in  acquiring  expertise  it  suggests  that  other  factors  beyond 
deliberate  practice  contribute  to  acquiring  expertise—opportunity  factors, 
basic ability factors, personality factors, developmental factors, and genetics 
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(Hambrick  et  al.,  2016).  Of  relevance  for  the  present  review  on  working 
memory in sports we will  focus on the basic ability factor of WMC. While 
Ericsson  and  Charness  (1994)  argued  WMC  would  only  influence 
performance in early phases of training it would be circumvented through 
domain-specific  knowledge when expert  status  was  acquired.  In  a  series  of 
studies  Hambrick  and  Meinz  (2011)  challenged  this  circumvention-of-limits  hypothesis  by 
demonstrating that WMC was associated with superior performance in complex tasks even in 
expert individuals with high levels of domain-specific knowledge. Hambrick et al. (2016) review 
further evidence supporting their “building block hypothesis”—expertise is explained by additive 
effects  of  domain-general  and domain-specific  factors—highlighting  that  the  basic  ability of 
WMC contributed additively to  the acquisition of  expertise  in  music and  Texas Hold’Em 
poker. This  research  suggests  that  in  some  domains  WMC can  limit  the  highest  level  of 
performance that a person can achieve, but Hambrick et al (2016, p. 26) acknowledge that WMC 
might not contribute to expert performance in every domain: “this is not to say that there are no 
conditions under which WMC and other basic abilities can be circumvented”. Hence, we will 
review evidence on the importance of WMC in sport expertise. 
Although we are not aware of any studies that have explicitly tested the “circumvention-
of-limits” or the “building-block” hypotheses in  the field of sports  similar  to  Hambrick and 
Meinz (2011), there have been studies investigating the contributions of basic abilities like WMC 
to sport expertise. Lyons, Hoffman, and Michel (2009) reported no correlation of scores on a 
standardized  cognitive  ability  battery  (the  Wonderlic  Test)  amongst  a  large  sample  of 
aspiring National Football League (NFL) players and their football performance. Based on these 
findings Hambrick et al. (2016) suggest that Football may be a domain in which cognitive ability 
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does not  significantly contribute to  success,  or  alternatively that  the  Wonderlic  Test  did not 
capture WMC or that team-level factors override the importance of individual level factors. On 
the other hand, a recent study (Vestberg, Gustafson, Maurex, Ingvar, & Petrovic, 2012) reported 
that  professional  soccer  players  had  higher  scores  on  a  standardized  measure  of  executive 
functioning which is closely related to WMC (D-KEFS; Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001) than 
lower level soccer players and a standardized norm population. Intriguingly, test scores of the 
professional soccer players were also predictive of the goals scored and assists of the tested 
soccer  players  two  years  later  (based  on  a  partial  correlation  of  the  square  root  of  the 
goals/assists and the test scores). These findings led the authors to suggest that “many of the 
required skills in team sports may be translated to general cognitive domains where test results 
can be compared to a population norm. A good team player could be characterized by excellent 
spatial attention, divided attention, working memory, and mentalizing capacity.” However, the 
data from Furley and Memmert (2012) did not indicate any differences in WMC between expert 
athletes and standardized control populations. Given the results of Vestberg et al. (2012) it is 
surprising that experienced basketball players (Counting Span Score: M =.65, SD =.07) actually 
performed slightly worse compared a standardized norm population (Kane et al., 2004, Counting 
Span Score: M = .69; SD = 0.15). Expert ice-hockey players (Automized Operation Span Score: 
M = 39.82, SD =18.3) did not show any differences compared to a standardized norm population 
(Unsworth et al., 2005, Automized Operation Span Score: M = 39.16; SD = 17.4). A further study 
(Memmert,  Simons,  &  Grimme,  2009)  did  not  find  differences  between  expert  team sport 
athletes, expert track athletes, and novices on several attention tasks. In addition, no differences 
were  evident  in  the  spatial  storage  component  of  working  memory  between  experienced 
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basketball  players  and college  students  with  no  team-sport  experience  (Furley & Memmert, 
2010).
Currently data on the relationship between sport expertise and general cognitive abilities 
is mixed (see Furley & Memmert, 2011 on a more detailed discussion of the ambiguous findings) 
and does not provide sufficient evidence for either the “circumvention-of-limits”  (Ericsson & 
Charness, 1994) or the “building block” (Hambrick et al., 2016) hypotheses of expertise in the 
domain of sports. Based on the existing evidence we are currently not convinced that expert 
athletes have superior WMC or other basic cognitive abilities compared to normal, physically 
active controls. We do not doubt that attentional control is a highly important attribute in certain 
sport  situations  but  currently the  evidence  does  not  suggest  that  superior  attentional  control 
capacities significantly contribute to sport expertise or even that WMC is a limiting factor for 
successful sport performance. Those sport athletes that are “lucky” to have a high WMC will 
most likely only have advantages in some sport situations that demand controlled attention as in 
Furley and Memmert (2012).
Hence, at present it is not warranted to assume that WMC is an important limiting basic 
ability in sports. Clearly, the requirements of sports are quite different to those of playing chess, 
the piano, or texas holdem poker and therefore different abilities are likely to be important in 
different domains.  Further,  every sport  is  different  and will  require a different skill  set  (e.g. 
Ericsson  et  al.,  2006)  and  therefore  different  abilities  might  be  beneficial  for  performance. 
Therefore, general theories of expertise have to take the specific constraints of the performance 
situations  into  account  and  pay careful  attention  not  to  over-generalize  the  implications  of 
specific findings in one domain across all domains as the relative influence of basic abilities and 
domain specific knowledge is bound to vary across domains. In the field of sport, research on 
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this important topic has just begun and has revealed ambiguous findings. Thus, more research is 
warranted to illuminate the role of basic abilities such as WMC in superior sports performance 
and specifically to test competing hypotheses (see Hambrick et al. 2016 for an overview) that 
have recently been stated in the expertise  literature.  In this  respect,  longitudinal  studies that 
assess both domain-specific factors (e.g.  deliberate practice) and domain-general factors (e.g. 
WMC) are needed across different domains.
 
Working memory training for athletes. Based on the individual difference findings on 
WMC and sport expertise we will briefly discuss whether athletes might benefit from training 
their WMC in order to improve their  attentional control capabilities as advertised by several 
companies  (e.g.  http://www.cogmed.com/executives-and-athletes;  retrieved  on  21.12.2015). 
Based  on  recent  evidence  (e.g.  Shipstead,  Redick,  & Engle,  2012)  we  would  currently  not 
recommend athletes, coaches, or sport teams to invest training time and other valuable resources 
in computer-based WMC training.
First,  the  studies  reviewed  above  do  not  suggest  that  WMC is  a  limiting  factor  for 
successful  sport  performance  and  so  far  studies  have  only  suggested  that  working  memory 
training can be an effective intervention for individuals for whom WMC is a limiting factor in 
everyday life  (Klingberg,  2010,  for  a  review). Second,  presently  the  evidence  for  cognitive 
enhancements  through  computerized  working  memory training  is  at  best  mixed,  with  some 
studies reporting cognitive improvements after computer-based WMC training (Klingberg, 2010) 
and others not (e.g., Owen et al., 2010). Anyway, the more important question concerning the 
present paper is not whether performance on cognitive tests can be improved by training but 
whether working memory training can improve performance in sports. To date, the evidence does 
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not support the notion that training programs advertised to improve WMC and in turn everyday 
attentional control among healthy adults improve cognitive functioning beyond the tasks that are 
actually being trained (Owen et al., 2010). Similarly, previous endeavors to improve athlete’s 
performance via generalized visual training programs have not proven to be successful (e.g., 
Abernethy  &  Wood,  2001).  Therefore,  in  consideration  of  the  present  evidence  on  WMC 
training, coaches would probably be better advised to conduct sport-specific training to enhance 
performance instead of incorporating computer-based working memory training sessions into 
their training schedules.
Concluding Remarks
Over 40 years ago Baddeley and Hitch put forth their model of working memory as they 
noticed that the majority of research on short-term memory was not very helpful in informing 
everyday activities. In the present paper we review relevant literature highlighting that working 
memory is helpful for understanding human cognition and functioning in everyday environments 
and sport. Although working memory is one of the most widely studied topics in psychology 
(Baddeley, 2007), working memory has not received as much research attention in the domain of 
human movement and sports. Contemporary theorizing in sports has recently been criticized for 
overemphasizing the autonomous, automatic nature of skilled sport performance (Furley et al., 
2015; Toner & Moran, 2014). By using dual-process theories as a metatheoretical starting point 
we  argue  that  future  research  in  sport  can  benefit  from a  greater  consideration  of  working 
memory theory and thereby fulfilling a necessity  in psychological  theorizing by pitting the 
conscious person against the deterministic situation (Mischel, 1997). In line with the suggestion 
of Moran (2009) and Moran and Brady (2010) who argued that the field of sports offers a fruitful 
domain  to  explore  the  validity  of  models  developed  in  other  fields,  we  show that  working 
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memory theory not only has its utility in conducting research in complex applied settings, but 
can  also  inform evidence-based  practice  in  sports.  Currently  there  is  a  lack  of  research  on 
working memory in the motor performance domain and we hope that this  review stimulates 
future research in this area. 
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